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The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics 
 
By 
Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley1 
 
Abstract  
 
Douglass North, along with Ronald Coase, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, 
transformed the early intuitions of new institutional economics into powerful conceptual 
and analytical tools that spawned a robust base of empirical research. NIE arose in 
response to questions not well explained by standard neoclassical models, such as make 
or buy? Or, why rich or poor? Today NIE is a success story by many measures: four 
Nobel laureates in under 20 years, increasing penetration of mainstream journals, and 
significant impact on major policy debates from anti-trust law to development aid. This 
paper provides a succinct overview of North’s evolving ideas about institutions and 
explains how North’s work shaped the emerging field of new institutional economics and 
had a potent impact on economics and the social sciences more broadly. North provides a 
powerful example of how persistent and well placed confidence and hard work can 
productively transform the status quo. North’s influence continues strong and his 
enthusiasm for exploring new frontiers and cooperating across artificial academic 
boundaries has never waned. 
  
                                                 
1
 Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne at the University of Paris –Pantheon Sorbonne (Ménard) and Ronald 
Coase Institute (Ménard and Shirley). Both participated actively to the foundation and are past presidents of 
the International Society for New Institutional Economics 
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I. Introduction 
 New Institutional Economics (NIE) began to take shape around some relatively 
vague intuitions only in the 1970s, yet today it counts a number of successes. To mention 
a few: four Nobel laureates in under 20 years; significant impacts on major policy debates 
ranging from anti-trust law to development aid; increasing penetration of mainstream 
journals; and a large and growing body of adherents, research, and data. Many actors 
were important to this successful evolution; in another paper we have focused on three in 
particular. Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson transformed early 
intuitions about institutions into powerful conceptual and analytical tools, spawning a 
vigorous base of empirical research. Starting somewhat later than the first three, Elinor 
Ostrom quickly had a major impact as well, especially on political science and 
environmental and development economics.   
Today’s robust institutionalization of NIE is especially remarkable when we 
consider that from the beginning it was divided into distinct schools of thought. One 
school of thought is identified with Coase and Williamson, and analyzes property rights 
and contracts at the firm level; while another, identified with Douglass North, analyzes 
broader institutional environments and the role of the state.2  Ostrom was one of the small 
but growing number of institutionalists who do empirical work encompassing both 
                                                 
2
 There are a number of other schools of thought that developed simultaneously and are closely associated 
with or even part of NIE that we do not have space to cover adequately here. These include, for example,  
the theories of Mancur Olson, public choice theory and the work of Buchanan and Tullock, and the work of 
positive political scientists such as Ken Shepsle and Barry Weingast. Closely associated with NIE is the 
work of Harold Demsetz, in the continuation of the property rights approach. However, when it comes to 
the history of how ISNIE was born and develop, we think that the two branches on which we focus here led 
the way and represent the dominant group of participants. Our Handbook of New Institutional Economics 
(2005) includes a relatively wide spectrum of the contributors to NIE, including the four Nobel laureates, 
although some other major names (e.g., Barzel or Demsetz) are missing 
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Williamsonian transaction cost economics and Northean institutional analysis.3  This 
review focuses on the contribution of Douglass North and the school of thought 
associated with his work to the development and institutionalization of NIE. The 
chapter’s main contribution is a succinct overview of North’s evolving ideas about 
institutions and an explanation of how North’s work shaped the emerging field of new 
institutional economics with important repercussions for economics and the social 
sciences more broadly. For example, North’s research changed many economists’ view 
of development from a process of growth spurred by new technology and capital 
accumulation to a dynamic process of institutional change. North’s ideas also helped set 
the agenda for scholars studying the post-communist transition, as Ghelback and Malesky 
argue in their chapter in this volume. This review of North’s work offers a valuable 
lesson of how persistent and well placed confidence and hard work can productively 
transform the status quo. 
 The next section of this paper summarizes how the key concepts that underlie all 
institutional analysis were formulated in response to puzzles not well explained by the 
standard neoclassical paradigm, in particular:  the decision to make, to buy, or to look for 
alternative organizational arrangements, and the explanation for why some countries are 
rich and some countries are poor. NIE accepts much of the standard neoclassical 
paradigm, although with important exceptions that give NIE its revolutionary character.4    
Section III then traces the special contribution of Douglass North to the transformation of 
NIE from early ideas to analytical tools, analyzing the evolution of his ideas on 
institutions, and Section IV describes the dissemination of NIE in general and North’s 
                                                 
3
 Another example of this sort of synthesis can be found in Greif 2006 and the case studies of urban water 
reform in Shirley, 2002. 
4
 In Ménard and Shirley (2012) we examine these exceptions in detail. 
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ideas in particular. Section V concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges for 
future research and the possibility that growing mainstream acceptance will erode NIE’s 
revolutionary character, creative focus, and interdisciplinary nature. How best can 
institutionalists avoid the risk of uninspiring and narrow minded orthodoxy? The 
remarkable scholarly life of Douglass North offers a stellar example of how creativity, 
insight, and innovation can be preserved and strengthened over the course of many 
decades.   
II. The Intellectual Origins of NIE5 
 
 Virginia Woolf once asserted that “on or about December 1910 human character 
changed.” (Woolf, 1928, p.4)  We cannot be so bold in determining when economics 
changed,6 but we can date the origins of the changes introduced by NIE. They emerged 
from the confluence of several major contributions: two pioneering papers from Ronald 
Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937/1988b) and “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960/ 
1988a), two defining books -- North and Davis on Institutional Change and American 
Economic Growth (1970) and North and Thomas on The Rise of the Western World 
(1973), and the land mark book Markets and Hierarchies (1975) by Williamson. 
Although there were predecessors, as there are with all schools of economics, these 
contributions laid the foundation for the transformation of NIE’s initial intuitions into a 
useful analytical apparatus. 
 As we mentioned, new institutional economics arose in response to two puzzles: 
why make or buy? Why rich or poor?  Solving the first puzzle required an explanation of 
why economic activity was organized into firms, markets, bureaus, franchises, and other 
                                                 
5
 This section draws from Menard and Shirley (2012). 
6
 Although we might note that Ronald Coase was born in December 1910. 
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modes of organization, to understand what went on inside the firm, and to explain firm 
decisions about mergers versus contacts. Solving the second puzzle demanded an 
explanation for the vast disparities in economic performance and why these disparities 
persist despite countless efforts at reform and decades of foreign aid and advice.   
The standard neoclassical paradigm viewed the economic system as adjusting 
supply to demand and production to consumption automatically, under the coordination of 
the price mechanism. Neoclassical economists long treated the firm as a black box, a 
production function that turned inputs into outputs, responding to changes in relative 
prices and available resources in ways that maximize profits. This system worked under 
certain simplifying assumptions that troubled the founders of NIE, such as the 
assumptions that information is perfect, individuals are rational wealth-maximizers with 
stable preferences, and exchange is instantaneous and costless. New institutionalists also 
questioned mainstream assumptions that different rates of development were purely the 
result of different endowments of resources and human capital or of different rates of 
investment and adoption of new technologies. Another puzzle that particularly concerned 
North was the nature of the state; why don’t political markets function like economic 
markets? Under what circumstances do states protect property rights even when they have 
unchallenged power to expropriate property and subjugate individuals? 7  
NIE’s answers to these fundamental economic puzzles rest on three key concepts 
– transaction costs, property rights and contracts.--the “golden triangle” of NIE These 
concepts, combined with NIE’s increasingly radical behavioral assumptions (e.g., North 
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 This has also been a prime concern of Robert Bates, whose lucid and compelling book, Beyond the 
Miracle of the Market (1989), cogently analyzes how economic institutions change political choices using 
Kenya as a case study.   
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2005), progressively structured NIE’s two leading schools. Let us consider briefly the 
origin of those three key concepts. 
 The concept of transaction cost arose when Ronald Coase first challenged the 
standard description of the economy as an automatic process that equilibrates supply with 
demand by means of the price mechanism in his 1937 paper “The Nature of the Firm.” 
Coase asked, why are there firms?8  The answer, as he later described it, was that 
“…although production could be carried out in a completely decentralized way by means 
of contract between individuals, the fact that it costs something to enter into these 
transactions means that firms will emerge to organize what would otherwise be market 
transactions whenever their costs were less than the costs of carrying out the transactions 
through the market.” (Coase, 1988a: 7)   In the market a would-be trader must find 
someone with whom to trade, determine price and quality, reach an agreement between 
buyer and seller, and monitor and enforce that agreement. By eliminating the need for 
bargains among the many owners of the factors of production, a firm can sometimes 
reduce these transaction costs (Coase 1960).  
Steven Cheung later enriched Coase’s idea, arguing that a firm would lower 
transaction costs whenever: discovering a price through the market required numerous 
transactions or information about many different components of a product or required 
measurement of attributes that change frequently, vary greatly, or may not be conveniently 
                                                 
8
 At about the same time that Coase wrote his paper, Commons (1934, p. 4) introduced the idea that “…the 
ultimate unit of activity…must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order. This 
unit is a transaction.” Coase was apparently unaware of this development, but later on Williamson (1975, 
p.6, 1996, p. 7) integrated it into his approach to transaction costs. 
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stipulated in advance; and whenever the different contributions of inputs cannot be easily 
separated (Cheung, 1983).9  
 Williamson operationalized the concept of transaction costs by asking: what are 
the specific factors that determine the choice between market and firm? How does a firm 
decide whether to make, to buy, or to rely on alternative arrangements such as 
franchising, joint ventures, strategic alliances and so forth? His answers focused in 
particular on the role of asset specificity, uncertainty, and the frequency of transacting, 
something we explore in greater detail in another paper (Menard and Shirley, 2012).  
 In later work Coase argued that transaction costs profoundly influence not just 
individual firms but the size and activities of the entire economy. “If the costs of making 
an exchange are greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange 
would not take place and the greater production that would flow from specialization 
would not be realized. In this way transaction costs affect not only contractual 
arrangements but also what goods and services are produced.” (Coase, 1992: 716)  
Continuing this idea, North used the concept of transaction costs to address the question: 
why are some countries rich and some countries poor?  
In particular, North extended the concept of transaction costs to explain the state 
and some of its fundamental characteristics (1990b). Political markets are more prone to 
inefficiency than economic markets. The cost of measuring and enforcing agreements is 
higher in political markets, North argued, because what is being exchanged – promises 
for votes – is inherently difficult to measure. Voters may find it hard to judge if the 
actions of their representatives produce outcomes that favor voter interests; voters may 
                                                 
9
 Cheung also showed how transaction costs affect contractual arrangement in different sectors, most 
notably agriculture (1969, 1973). 
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not even know what their interests are under certain policy choices. And voter ability to 
judge their representatives’ effectiveness is clouded by beliefs: representatives do not just 
make policy promises to their constituents, they also sell themselves on the basis of 
ideological frameworks that appeal to voters’ preferences and prejudices. Competition, 
which plays a powerful enforcement role in economic markets, is far weaker in political 
markets, where representatives can be held accountable only in infrequent elections. Non-
democratic political markets lacking even electoral competition operate with far less 
transparency, so political transaction costs are likely to be even higher. 
 NIE’s second central concept is property rights. Standard neoclassical economics 
assumed that what people trade are physical commodities, but Coase argued in his paper 
“The Federal Communications Commission” that what they really trade are rights -- the 
rights to perform certain actions -- and that those rights with their duties and privileges 
are established by the legal system (Coase 1959). This view of property rights was further 
developed by Armen Alchian in a contribution initially published in Il Politico in 1965, 
where he defined property rights as a set of rights to take permissible actions to use, 
transfer, or otherwise exploit or enjoy property. These rights are sometimes enforced by 
law but more often are enforced by etiquette, social custom, and social ostracism.10   
 Unlike standard neoclassical economics, which assumes contracts are complete 
and costlessly enforceable through the judicial system, Williamson’s work on contracts 
also implied that property rights would be vulnerable to opportunistic predation and that 
legal systems are usually a more costly remedy for disputes than private ordering. North 
focused on how property rights and their enforcement affect the ways societies develop 
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 Demsetz (1967) substantiated Alchian’s view in his controversial analysis of the emergence of private 
property rights among the ‘Montagnais’, a tribe of Northeastern Canada where he argued that property 
rights arise when it becomes economically beneficial. 
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and differ. North contrasted the robust property rights of powerful elites with the 
vulnerable or absent rights of non-elites in societies where non-elites have little access to 
legal or political remedies.  
Ostrom further expanded and enhanced our understanding of property rights with 
her work on alternative ways to organize common property resources such as irrigation 
systems or fishing grounds to those postulated by mainstream economics: private 
ownership or state regulation. Ostrom argued that under certain circumstances 
governance by local user groups is superior  to poorly defined and enforced private 
property rights (leading to the tragedy of the commons), as well as to government 
regulation or state ownership. Through meticulous and extensive field work and 
laboratory experiments Ostrom showed that where the boundaries of the users and the 
resources are clear, monitoring and enforcement by small, tightly-knit groups with strong 
social norms and procedures for making rules and enforcing sanctions produces superior 
outcomes. Ostrom’s evolving theoretical framework provided a foundation for scientific 
analysis of highly complex and heterogeneous institutions through carefully designed 
comparative microanalytics. 
 NIE’s third core concept is contract. In the standard neoclassical paradigm, 
contracts are agreements between parties that are (1) perfectly enforced and (2) perfectly 
complete. Once again the concept of contract was progressively developed along different 
paths by the two main branches of NIE. Williamson stressed the issue of incomplete 
contracts as early as 1971 in a paper on vertical integration. In his formulation, 
opportunism -- the idea that parties to an exchange may defect from the spirit of 
cooperation when the stakes are high -- overturned neoclassical behavioral assumptions 
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that ignored these human traits. To Williamson, a contract is “an agreement between a 
buyer and a supplier in which the terms of exchange are defined by a triple: price, asset 
specificity, and safeguards” (ital. from OEW, 1996: 377). Williamson’s approach to 
contracts became central to NIE’s analysis of governance, and, as emphasized by the 
Nobel Committee in 2009, the source of many successful empirical investigations, 
operationalizing the Coasian approach in micro-economics and industrial organization. 
 The ‘Northean’ branch emphasized early on the key role of contract enforcement 
and the institutions it requires, particularly the polity (North, 1981, Ch. 4).11  Contract 
enforcement and especially the role of coercion in protecting property rights and 
individual rights later developed into a theory of its own. North highlighted the trade off 
between the high cost of private protection of property using private police, private 
armies and the like, versus the risk of state protection of property, which might reduce 
private costs but invite state encroachment on rights (see North et al., 2009; and also 
North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1993; Greif, 2005). The risk of state predation led 
North, Weingast, and others to emphasize ways the state might credibly commit to 
respect private property rights, a theme that united the two branches of NIE.   
 Transaction costs, property rights, and contracts are not the only concepts 
developed by NIE, but we argue that they encapsulate its core and make its paradigm 
distinctive. One reason why NIE differs radically from the orthodox approach is because 
these core concepts reject standard neoclassical assumptions of perfect information, 
perfect rationality, and zero transaction costs. 
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 See also the influence of Buchanan & Tullock (1962) on North; and Buchanan (1975) on Williamson. 
Barzel’s contribution to the analysis of property rights and the violence of the state also deserves mention 
here (e.g., 1989). 
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III. From Early Ideas to Analytical Tools: The Contribution of Douglass North
 In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, these early ideas about transaction costs, 
property rights and contracts were already evolving into the core concepts of what 
Williamson christened New Institutional Economics (Williamson, 1975, chap.1). A 
research program progressively blossomed challenging some of the main assumptions of 
standard neoclassical economics. As we have mentioned, this program developed almost 
simultaneously along two branches. In another paper we consider both branches and their 
interactions, but here we focus on the contribution of Douglass North to the branch that 
we call institutional analysis. 
 Douglass North’s earliest intellectual roots were as a Marxist when he was an 
undergraduate at the University of California at Berkeley (See Figure 1). Another early 
influence was World War II: North had to think profoundly about violence and societies 
when he decided to join the merchant marine because, as he put it, “I did not want to kill 
people.”  Later he was exposed to the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter through the 
entrepreneurial school of Arthur Cole at Harvard. Schumpeter had a strong influence on 
North’s thinking, as did his interactions with the economists he met when he spent a year 
at the NBER in the mid-1950’s, including Solomon Fabricant and Simon Kuznets.   
 In the later 1950’s and early 1960’s North became a leader in the first efforts to 
apply economic theory and quantitative methods to history and in the process became a 
founder of the new field of cliometrics (another subject in its own right and beyond the 
scope of this paper). His emphasis on institutions began later and developed gradually. 
The rest of this section summarizes some of the main milestones in North’s institutional 
theories, which we illustrate in Figure 2.   
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 In his 1961 and 1966 books on economic history North largely followed the 
standard model. For instance, he attributed economic growth to three factors: technology, 
human capital, and efficient economic organization, giving primacy to technological 
change (North, 1961, 1966). But North was beginning to question the applicability of 
mainstream economics in the 1960’s when he turned to study European history. 
Increasingly he concluded that the tools of neoclassical economics “were not up to the 
task of explaining the kind of fundamental societal change that had characterized 
European economies from medieval times onward” (North 1993: 3).  
 North departed noticeably from a strictly neoclassical approach in his famous 
1968 paper in the Journal of Political Economy (one of the most quoted research works 
in economic history according to the Nobel committee). This paper explains the reasons 
for productivity gains in ocean shipping since 1600. Prior to this paper, as North puts it, 
“Among economic historians, technological change has always held the pre-eminent 
position as a source of economic growth” (North 1993, p. 953). North’s 1968 paper 
knocked technology off its throne.  
 The genesis of the paper was exceptionally hands on. While pondering the puzzle 
of productivity gains in shipping, North toured a maritime museum in the Netherlands. 
North noticed that the ship models did not display any major technology improvements, 
but did carry fewer and fewer armaments. He went home and built models of ships from 
historical kits to confirm his observations. North knew first hand from his experience in 
the merchant marine the importance of weight and labor costs to productivity in ocean 
shipping, and the paper shows how a decline in piracy and privateering permitted ships to 
reduce both heavy armaments and manpower and also lowered insurance costs. 
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Additional key factors in productivity improvements were the development of bigger 
markets and the aggregation of goods in fewer ports, which allowed ships to transport 
goods in both directions and reduced turnaround time in port. Through a combination of 
practical experience, keen observation, and meticulous research, North opened a new 
perspective on productivity improvement. 
 North’s 1971 book with Lance Davis, Institutional Change and American 
Economic Growth (North 1971) continued to diminish the priority assigned to technology 
as the explanation for growth. North and Davis also specified a theory of institutional 
change, which they applied to facets of US economic history. Despite its unorthodoxy, 
the book still showed strong neoclassical roots, especially in its hypothesis that 
institutional innovation occurs when the expected net gains exceed the expected costs.   
 North’s 1973 book with Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. A 
New Economic History similarly moved toward giving organizational and institutional 
change a greater role in determining growth. North and Thomas asserted that “efficient 
economic organization is the key to growth” and efficient economic organization entails 
“the establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights that create an 
incentive to channel individual economic effort into activities that bring the private rate 
of return close to the social rate of return.” (North and Thomas 1973, p. I) The book 
argued that it was new institutional arrangements such as written contracts enforced by 
courts that were largely responsible for successful European economic development 
because they enabled units “to realize economies of scale (joint stock companies, 
corporations), to encourage innovation (prizes, patent laws), to improve the efficiency of 
factor markets (enclosures, bills of exchange, the abolition of serfdom), or to reduce 
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market imperfections (insurance companies)” (Ibid: 5-6). North and Thomas stressed that 
fragile property rights are an important obstacle to economic development and Galiani 
and Schargrodsky’s chapter in this volume provides strong evidence of the effects of land 
titling on the poor in Buenos Aires. 
Yet the North and Thomas framework still showed neoclassical roots. For 
instance, it still assumed that institutions changed when the net benefit from change 
outweighed the cost, although North and Thomas did document that the fiscal benefits to 
government sometimes lead the state to protect inefficient property rights for a very long 
time, as in Spain, a forecast of North’s future direction.   
 Increasingly North began to ask how these efficiency assumptions could be true 
when for centuries most countries have suffered under persistently inefficient institutions 
causing persistently poor economic performance. He sought a more realistic explanation 
for why societies choose the institutions they have and why they choose to change them. 
In his breakthrough book, Structure and Change in Economic History (North 1981) he 
abandoned the assumption that institutions were efficient, and he also introduced the role 
of ideology in fostering or hindering change, foreshadowing his later interest in beliefs.  
  North’s seminal 1990 book, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance, went further in abandoning neoclassical assumptions about efficiency and 
rationality (1990a). Here North answers his persistent question about wealth and poverty 
as follows: “Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a 
set of payoffs to political/economic activity that do not encourage productive activity” 
(Ibid, p. 110). In this book institutional change occurs when those economic or political 
entrepreneurs who have the bargaining strength to change institutions perceive “that they 
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could do better by altering the existing institutional framework on some margin. But their 
perceptions crucially depend on both the information the entrepreneurs receive and how 
they process that information” (Ibid: 8). Their information is often incomplete, their 
models imperfect, and their reforms “path dependent” -- constrained by the existing set of 
institutions and incentives.     
North began to go beyond information problems and path dependency, arguing that 
radical reforms are also constrained by societies’ inherited belief systems. “Societies that 
get ‘stuck’ embody belief systems and institutions that fail to confront and solve new 
problems of societal complexity” (North, 1994: 6). The sticky nature of beliefs and 
institutions helps explain why underdevelopment has been so persistent in most of the 
world and why efforts to reform by importing rules, laws, and constitutions from elsewhere 
have been so unsuccessful. But a new puzzle arose. If rules and norms resist change 
because of beliefs, then what determines beliefs?  North turned to cognitive science to 
understand better how human’s beliefs are affected by their “mental models.”  Human 
beings use mental models to explain and interpret the world, models that are shaped by 
their personal experiences and their inherited belief system – the belief system that they 
share with other members of their society. Because learning is filtered through this shared 
belief system, the past affects how people solve problems today (North, 2005: 77). 12 
 Having developed an institutional framework to explain European and American 
history and then having adapted it to explain the history of underdevelopment, North 
recently joined with John Wallis and Barry Weingast to interpret all of recorded human 
history (North, et al. 2009). Their analysis starts ten thousand years ago when humans 
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 In this same vein the chapter by Dal Bò in this volume presents experimental evidence that people’s 
willingness to demand efficient institutional change depends on their understanding of the environment. 
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were still dominated by warring tribes. In some of these tribes small groups of powerful 
elites formed coalitions around specialists in violence who could protect non-military 
elites, such as traders or the clergy, and limit outsiders’ access to valuable resources – 
land, labor, capital – and valuable activities – trade, worship, education (Ibid: 30). 
Limiting non-elite access gave elites exclusive control over resources and activities that 
generated rents. These rents in turn motivated the elites to agree not to fight each other 
but to share power, creating a stable equilibrium for expanded trade and production – and 
additional rents. This equilibrium was so stable that limited access orders came to 
dominate most societies through most of human history; they became the “natural state.”  
 Natural states encompasses a large and varied group; some are “fragile,” tottering 
on the brink of chaos and war; others are “basic” with more durable and stable state 
organizations; and some are “mature” with many of the formal trapping of open access 
such as secure property rights, regular elections, and apparently open trade. But all 
natural states, even the mature ones, enforce property rights and rule of law only for 
elites, and all have institutions designed to limit access. Access is limited in basic and 
fragile natural states by laws and norms that allow only elites to engage in trade or to 
create or dominate corporations, unions, political parties, clubs, and other organizations. 
Non-elites may not be explicitly excluded from starting businesses or going into politics 
in mature natural states, but if they try they will face such high transaction costs that they 
will not be able to compete with elites. For example, it will be much cheaper and easier 
for elite-run business to get credit or government contracts because banks and state 
agencies are run by their cronies. Elites in natural states use the law, the state, social 
networks, and tradition to limit access and retain control, but that does not mean that the 
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specific elite group that controls power and wealth never changes. To the contrary, the 
personalities with power and wealth change frequently through coups, revolutions, and 
even elections. What seldom changes are the institutions that exclude the bulk of society 
from access to the means of power and wealth. When non-elite groups manage to wrest 
control from the elites, the new insiders usually use the same exclusionary institutions to 
limit access for everyone outside their circle.  
 Open access societies are still the exception. They only emerged recently, after 
the industrial revolution in Europe, and spread to the countries that now compose the 
developed world. They operate very differently from limited access orders; they are 
distinguished by shared belief systems emphasizing equality, sharing, and universal 
inclusion. Open access institutions ensure that the political system controls the use of 
violence, laws are enforced impartially, and citizens across society have access to 
competitive economic and political organizations at relatively low transaction costs. Not 
only is access open, the risks of market participation are reduced and the gains across 
society are shared through such means as universal education, social insurance programs, 
and widespread infrastructure and public goods (Ibid: 111).  
 Economic development takes on a new meaning in North, Wallis, and Weingast’s 
framework. “In addition to capital accumulation, being developed economically entails 
having sophisticated economic organizations and credible enforcement of property rights 
and other contractual commitments. Similarly, being developed politically entails having 
rule of law, a constitutional setting in which all major players accept changes of power, 
effective legal recognition of organizational rights independently of who is in power, and 
state control of organized violence.” (North et al. 2009: 3) 
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 North, Wallis, and Weingast is the latest in North’s evolving insights about how 
institutions explain long-run economic performance, insights that have stimulated a large 
body of applied research. Simultaneous with this rising interest in Northean institutional 
analysis, there was a rising interest in NIE more broadly, and we document both trends in 
our next section. 
IV. The Diffusion of NIE in General and Institutional Analysis in Particular  
 North’s work contributed to a general diffusion of new institutional economics, 
and the feedback from this expanding network also fed into his evolving theory. The 
diffusion of NIE was also spurred by the creation of an international society, a process in 
which North also played an important role. 
IV. A. The Diffusion of New Institutional Economics 
 During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s a growing number of researchers were 
attracted to NIE and its influence over economics and other disciplines began to expand. 
Scholars increasingly cited Coase, North, and Williamson in the literature, presentations 
and sessions on institutional research at international conferences multiplied, and the 
subject attracted adherents in political science, management, law, sociology, and 
anthropology, among others. We can get a partial picture of this trend by looking at the 
increase in articles referring to NIE in refereed journals. Publications listed in Goggle 
Scholar with new institutional economics in the title grew from one in the 1970’s and 50 
in the 1980’s to close to 200 in the 1990’s and over 400 in the 2000’s.  
With the spread of articles on new institutional economics, a network of new 
institutionalists began to emerge. At first the network was informal and unorganized: 
scholars with an interest in institutions simply attended each other’s presentations at 
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meetings in economics, managerial sciences, history, political science, and other social 
sciences. This informal network got a boost in 1983 when Rudolf Richter began to organize, 
initially with Eirik Furubotn, an annual research seminar on institutions in Germany.13 All 
leading institutionalists attended this conference at one time or another, and their 
contributions were published in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.  
 Still, this informal network was largely sustained by sporadic and haphazard 
encounters of like-minded institutionalists in conference devoted to other topics. The 
sporadic nature of these contacts frustrated some scholars who began to discuss the 
creation of a more formal network in the early 1990’s. In a process that we have 
documented in another paper (Menard and Shirley 2012), their activities led to the 
creation of the International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), with 
annual meetings that gave a large boost to the diffusion of the field.   
 Douglass North played a key role in the creation of ISNIE. He was highly 
supportive of the idea of a more formal network from the first time Claude Menard 
proposed it in a 1994 conference in Paris. He continued to be enthusiastic throughout the 
startup of the new organization, providing strong support to initiatives led by Lee and 
Alexandra Benham, Claude Menard, and Mary Shirley, later reinforced by John Drobak 
and others. North co-signed a letter with Ronald Coase inviting a large group of scholars 
to join the new society in October 1996. He participated actively in the early planning 
meetings and agreed to join the board of directors and to serve two terms (1988-2000) as 
the second president of the new society (Ronald Coase was the first). He continued 
thereafter to lend his strong support to ISNIE as a board member and regular speaker at 
the meetings. As we report elsewhere (Menard and Shirley 2012), ISNIE has provided 
                                                 
13
 Held in Mettlach for the first two years than in Wallerfangen, under which name the seminar became known. 
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institutional scholars with a regular point of contact, attracted new adherents to NIE, and 
accelerated the dialogue between the two main branches and across disciplines. 
IV. B. The Diffusion of Northean Institutional Analysis 
 Initially the branch of institutional analysis identified with Douglass North captured 
a wider audience, while Coasian-Williamsonian ideas were highly influential in specific 
fields, such as industrial organization, managerial science, and law and economics.14,15  We 
can see the spread of North’s ideas in Figure 3, which shows the rise in citations of North’s 
articles. Since most of North’s most influential publications are books, this figure gives a 
very partial indication of his impact but it does show the strong upward trend.  
North’s work had an impact on a number of fields. For example, his work was 
one of a number of important influences shaping the direction of the new political 
economy. Initially new political economy largely focused on the United States and 
democracy, voting, legislative rules, and bureaucracy, but more recently there has been 
an upsurge in studies analyzing a broader set of institutions and covering polities in 
European and developing and transitional countries. Northean institutional analysis also 
influenced how scholars study utilities, such as telecommunications, water, or electricity, 
and common pool problems and management of small communities, such as Ostrom’s 
work. Increasingly these scholars are analyzing how broader political, constitutional, and 
                                                 
14
 By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the Coasean-Williamsonian branch had begun to win wider 
adherents as well, and both branches of NIE became well established. For specifics on NIE’s diffusion see 
The Handbook of New Institutional Economics. The references provided in their different chapters 
substantiate the richness of analysis already available at the time the book was published. Further evidence 
can be found in the collection of papers in Furubotn and Richter (1991), in the seven volumes by Ménard 
(2004b), in Brousseau and Glachant (2008), and in the synthesis already proposed by Furubotn and Richter 
(1997). See also partial surveys provided in Shelanski and Klein (1995), Klein (2005), Ménard (2004a). 
15
 North’s enormous impact on historical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper; indeed we cannot truly 
do justice to his huge impact on economics and other disciplines.   
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societal institutions affect sector or locality rules and performance.16  Similarly, in law 
and economics, studies of how legal institutions frame market exchanges and investor 
incentives have ballooned since the 1980’s.17 
 North’s ideas had an especially strong impact on development economists, 
practitioners in the aid community, and policy makers and scholars in developing 
countries. The collapse of planned economies opened a Pandora’s box of choices, and 
scholars and practitioners alike seized on Northean institutional analysis to help inform 
these decisions. Scholars studying underdevelopment turned to North as one of the few 
prominent economists offering persuasive new answers to the question of why some 
countries are rich and some countries are poor. Starting in the mid-1990’s the importance 
of institutions to development began to be increasingly accepted among development 
scholars and practitioners. North was first invited to speak at the World Bank in 1994, 
and spoke frequently to aid agencies, consulted with presidents and top officials of 
developing countries, and gave speeches to packed audiences in developing countries 
around the world. The World Bank devoted one of its flagship publications, the 2002 
World Development Report, to institutions and development, and institutional issues 
were also taken up in many subsequent WDRs as well as in World Bank Policy Research 
Reports starting with Bureaucrats in Business (1995). Other international agencies soon 
adopted the same focus (see for example, InterAmerican Development Bank 2003, 
International Monetary Fund 2003, 2005). Interestingly, critiques of development 
assistance were also strongly influenced by North. These critiques cite the failure and 
                                                 
16
 See for example, Ostrom’s work on common pool resources and case studies of local management; Levy 
and Spiller 1996 on telecommunicatons; Shirley, ed. 2002 on water supply and the chapter on regulation of 
public utilities by Spiller and Tommasi in the Handbook of New Institutional Economics. 
17
 See for example, the several chapters on legal institutions in the Handbook of New Institutional Economics. 
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even inability of foreign aid to deal adequately with institutional barriers to growth (see, 
for example, Easterly 2002, Martens et. al 2002, Shirley 2008). One reason for this 
apparently paradoxical influence was the tendency of some in the aid community to 
ignore those aspects of institutional analysis that conflicted with their belief that outside 
assistance can change institutions (e.g. Shirley, 2008). 
The implications of Northean institutional analysis for growth also began to have 
a large impact on macro economists. So-called new growth economists increasingly 
included aggregate measures of institutions in Solow style growth models. Unlike the 
earlier frustrating experience of scholars who tried to correlate growth with democracy 
with often ambiguous results, these economists discovered that institutional variables had 
statistically strong, positive correlations with growth. These strong correlations led even 
some previously disdainful mainstream economists to use them in their own work. As 
one economist described the situation: “Growth economists who, as mentioned earlier, 
used to rely almost uniquely on pareto-optimal-complete-market-perfectly competitive 
neoclassical models, now systematically abandon their traditional paradigms without 
being ashamed and they discuss the role of institutions without thinking they are doing 
second-rate research” (Sala-i-Martin, 2002: 17, emphasis added). Furthermore, these 
“institutional” measures were easily accessible. For example, Knack and Keefer 1995, 
one of the earliest papers to use an aggregate measure of institutions in regressions and 
perhaps the one that launched this trend, used widely available commercial risk ratings as 
proxies for institutional quality. The subsequent upsurge in studies employing this and 
similar variables has been a mixed blessing, since the variables are abstract and general, 
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running counter to NIE’s emphasis on increasing precision and specificity in economics. 
But they did spur wider interest in institutions among mainstream economists. 
 Initially most applied institutional analysis focused largely on formal, written 
institutions, neglecting North’s emphasis on societal norms and beliefs.18  Among the few 
authors to defy this trend was Elinor Ostrom who emphasized social norms in the success 
of community groups in managing common property. Avner Greif is another 
institutionalist who treats social norms seriously. For Greif, beliefs, norms, and 
organizations are as much a part of institutions as Northean rules. Indeed, for Greif, 
institutions are such powerful motivators precisely because they incorporate individuals’ 
beliefs and internalized norms about the world, including their expectations of how others 
will behave and will expect them to behave. Joel Mokyr also emphasizes beliefs, which he 
defines to include knowledge and attitudes towards science and technology as well as 
religious beliefs and ideology. In his chapter in this volume he argues that beliefs, values, 
and preferences shared by some subset of society encompass culture. For Mokyr culture 
and cultural entrepreneurs are an important part of the explanation for why some 
economies evolve institutions that enable them to develop faster. 19  
V. Conclusion 
 As we have shown, research on NIE spread rapidly and the diffusion of the 
Northean branch was especially fast. But institutional analysis faces some major 
challenges for the future. One is to develop a satisfactory general theory of NIE that 
integrates Northean institutional analysis with Williamsonian transaction cost economics. 
                                                 
18
 The same is true of econometric studies regressing growth on institutional variables. Of 59 such studies 
that were categorized by Shirley, only 6 dealt with informal institutions, specifically trust and social capital 
(Shirley 2005).  
19
 See also Jakiela’s chapter in this volume, which uses cross-country experiments to measure the effects of 
informal institutions. 
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A general theory would explain how the institutional framework (described by North as 
the scaffolding for human transactions) interacts with the structure of governance 
(defined by Williamson as the matrix in which the integrity of a transaction is organized). 
This raises a lot of issues explored by Ménard 2006, issues that will likely shape much 
future research. A foremost issue would be: how do the (Northean) rules that determine 
the security and functioning of property rights or the laws that affect contractual 
credibility and enforcement shape the choice of (Williamsonian) modes of governance 
and of the ways to organize transactions?  A related question is: what are the comparative 
costs of different institutional schemes, such as different judicial systems for 
implementing contractual laws?   
 Beyond this daunting challenge of bridging the gap between a society’s general 
institutional framework and its specific transactions and modes of governance, there are 
also areas where institutional analysis needs to be developed further. North himself has 
challenged NIE to produce better theories, especially a theory of the state, and better 
explanations of growth and innovation.20 NIE needs a better theory of institutional change 
as well. Some aspects of current institutional theory make change seem almost impossible. 
North has long argued that change in deeply rooted institutions is fundamentally gradual 
and incremental (e.g. North 1990b). Change is gradual because long standing beliefs and 
conventions are usually slow to change, even though formal institutions can change 
rapidly in response to deliberate policies. But the abrupt changes in Eastern Europe, 
                                                 
20
 North’s emphasis on the need for a better understanding of politics is echoed in Bates’ chapter in this 
volume. 
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Taiwan, or South Korea presents a challenge to this theory, as do sudden changes in 
informal institutions.21 22 
 These challenges notwithstanding, the future for NIE broadly and for institutional 
analysis specifically looks very bright. Acceptance and adherents continue to grow, and 
new research is pushing out the frontiers of the field. Indeed, one of the most daunting 
challenges for NIE is no longer to survive and prosper, but to maintain its revolutionary 
character and be open to good ideas from across disciplines without abandoning the 
powerful tools of economics. Further conceptual breakthroughs depend on rising to this 
challenge. It is true that cross-disciplinary work has drawbacks. The expansion of 
institutional analysis across the social sciences has resulting in a host of sometimes 
confusing and contradictory theories.23 Yet powerful partnerships have also emerged, for 
example, in political economy or in law and economics. One of the strengths of NIE is 
that, unlike some schools of economics, it has not isolated itself from the rest of the social 
and physical sciences. Here the founding thinkers have led the way. They all have freely 
adopted from other fields: most notably, Coase from law, Williamson from managerial 
sciences and organizational theory, and North from political science, cognitive science, 
and history.  
The increasing mainstream acceptance of new institutional economics may tempt 
some institutionalists to demand greater methodological orthodoxy which could stifle 
NIE’s creativity. North stands as a living example against this danger; he continues to 
                                                 
21
 For example, the convention of foot binding in China, which had been practiced for millennia, was ended 
in a decade (Mackie, 1996).   
22
 Shepsle, in his chapter in this volume, also challenges North’s view of rules as exogenous constraints.   
23
 In her chapter in this volume Ostrom mentions the confusing treatment of institutions in policies 
proposed to increase the sustainability of ecological systems. Bates’ chapter attributes some of the 
confusion in the analysis of institutions to the implicit use of different time frames. 
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exemplify the revolutionary roots of NIE. As our brief summary of his work indicates, 
North’s creativity has never ebbed and his research always seeks new frontiers. He has 
often been the first to challenge his own conclusions and has never let his past work 
become a hindrance in his search for radical new approaches. This has kept institutional 
analysis in the forefront, attracting new adherents in pursuit of new research directions.  
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Figure 2: North’s Evolving View of
Institutions as Reflected in his Major Publications 
1961: Economic Growth of the US 1790 - 1860
1968: “Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping” JPE
1966: Growth & Welfare in the American Past
1970 w/Davis: Institutional Change & American Economic Growth
1973 w/Thomas: The Rise of the Western World
1981: Structure & Change in Economic History
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